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Collapse	Theories	
	
Peter	J.	Lewis	
	
The	collapse	postulate	in	quantum	mechanics	is	problematic.	In	standard	presentations	of	the	
theory,	the	state	of	a	system	prior	to	a	measurement	is	a	sum	of	terms,	with	one	term	representing	
each	possible	outcome	of	the	measurement.	According	to	the	collapse	postulate,	a	measurement	
precipitates	a	discontinuous	jump	to	one	of	these	terms;	the	others	disappear.	The	reason	this	is	
problematic	is	that	there	are	good	reasons	to	think	that	measurement	per	se	cannot	initiate	a	new	
kind	of	physical	process.	This	is	the	measurement	problem,	discussed	in	section	1	below.	
The	problem	here	lies	not	with	collapse,	but	with	the	appeal	to	measurement.	That	is,	a	
theory	that	could	underwrite	the	collapse	process	just	described	without	ineliminable	reference	to	
measurement	would	constitute	a	solution	to	the	measurement	problem.	This	is	the	strategy	pursued	
by	dynamical	(or	spontaneous)	collapse	theories,	which	differ	from	standard	presentations	in	that	
they	replace	the	measurement-based	collapse	postulate	with	a	dynamical	mechanism	formulated	in	
terms	of	universal	physical	laws.	Various	dynamical	collapse	theories	of	quantum	mechanics	have	
been	proposed;	they	are	discussed	in	section	2.	
But	dynamical	collapse	theories	face	a	number	of	challenges.	First,	they	make	different	
empirical	predictions	from	standard	quantum	mechanics,	and	hence	are	potentially	empirically	
refutable.	Of	course,	testability	is	a	virtue,	but	since	we	have	no	empirical	reason	to	think	that	
systems	ever	undergo	collapse,	dynamical	collapse	theories	are	inherently	empirically	risky.	Second,	
there	are	difficulties	reconciling	the	dynamical	collapse	mechanism	with	special	relativity.	Third,	the	
post-collapse	state	is	not	the	same	as	the	post-measurement	state	of	standard	quantum	mechanics,	
raising	the	possibility	that	dynamical	collapse	theories	do	not	solve	the	measurement	problem	after	
all.	These	challenges	are	described	in	sections	3,	4	and	5,	respectively.	
	 Assuming	that	these	challenges	can	be	met,	dynamical	collapse	theories	can	lay	claim	to	
being	serious	contenders	for	the	correct	description	of	the	quantum	world.	And	the	description	they	
provide	has	a	number	of	interesting	consequences.	First,	it	makes	indeterminism	an	irreducible	fact	
about	the	physical	world.	It	has	been	argued	that	this	has	important	consequences	for	the	
foundations	of	statistical	mechanics,	for	free	will,	and	for	consciousness.	These	claims	are	discussed	
in	section	6.	
Second,	many	dynamical	collapse	theories	imply	that	the	quantum	wave	function	is	
fundamental,	and	that	particles	are	just	a	temporary	“bunching	up”	of	the	fundamental	wave-like	
entity.	This	understanding	of	the	ontology	of	the	quantum	world	gives	rise	to	a	new	kind	of	
vagueness,	since	a	wave	can	be	fuzzy	around	the	edges	in	a	way	that	a	particle	cannot.	Furthermore,	
the	quantum	wave	function	is	defined	over	a	high-dimensional	space,	not	the	three-dimensional	
space	of	experience,	suggesting	to	some	that	three-dimensionality	is	an	illusion.	Dynamical	collapse	
theories	share	these	implications	with	other	“wave	function	only”	theories,	such	as	Everettian	
approaches,	and	share	some	of	them	with	wave	function	realist	versions	of	Bohmian	approaches.	
These	implications	of	dynamical	collapse	theories	are	considered	in	section	7.	
	
1.	The	Measurement	Problem	
	
Quantum	mechanics	represents	the	state	of	a	system	in	various	ways,	but	the	representation	that	is	
most	perspicuous	for	understanding	collapse	theories	uses	a	wave	function.	For	a	single	particle,	the	
wave	function	is	a	complex-valued	function	of	three	spatial	dimensions	and	time:	𝜓(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑡).	The	
wave	function	changes	over	time	according	to	a	linear	differential	equation,	the	Schrödinger	
equation.	
To	begin	with,	let	us	stipulate	that	a	particle	is	located	in	a	particular	spatial	region	if	and	
only	if	all	the	corresponding	wave	function	amplitude	is	contained	in	that	region.	(We	will	have	
reason	to	relax	this	stipulation	later.)	So,	for	example,	the	wave	function	shown	schematically	(in	
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one	dimension)	in	figure	1(a)	represents	a	particle	in	region	A,	and	the	one	in	figure	1(b)	represents	
a	particle	in	a	distinct	region	B.	
	 The	trouble	with	quantum	mechanics	starts	from	the	superposition	principle,	which	says	that	
the	sum	of	any	two	quantum	states	is	also	a	quantum	state.	That	is,	if	we	take	the	function	in	figure	
1(a)	and	add	it	to	the	function	in	figure	1(b),	we	obtain	another	possible	state	of	the	particle,	shown	
in	figure	1(c).	(We	also	need	to	rescale	the	function,	due	to	the	connection	between	the	area	under	
the	curve	and	probability,	to	be	explained	shortly.)	
States	like	1(c)	are	crucial	to	quantum	mechanical	explanations.	But	according	to	our	earlier	
stipulation,	the	wave	function	in	figure	1(c)	is	not	a	state	in	which	the	particle	is	in	region	A,	and	it	is	
not	a	state	in	which	the	particle	is	in	region	B.	Nevertheless,	when	the	position	of	a	particle	in	such	a	
state	is	measured,	it	is	always	found	in	one	location	or	the	other.	Why	should	a	state	in	which	the	
particle	is	not	in	A	and	not	in	B	generate	a	measurement	result	in	which	the	particle	is	found	in	one	
of	these	locations?		
	 The	founders	of	quantum	mechanics	were	aware	of	this	problem.	Born	(1926)	noted	that	
the	wave	function	can	be	used	to	generate	the	probabilities	of	the	two	outcomes:	the	square	of	the	
area	under	the	wave	function	in	region	A	is	the	probability	that	the	particle	will	be	found	in	region	A,	
and	similarly	for	region	B.	This	is	the	Born	rule.	But	the	Born	rule	just	quantifies	the	problem:	if	the	
particle	is	not	in	region	A,	why	is	there	a	50%	chance	of	finding	it	there?	
	 The	standard	response,	codified	by	von	Neumann	(1932),	was	to	postulate	that	there	are	
two	dynamical	processes	by	which	the	wave	function	changes	over	time.	Between	measurements,	
the	wave	function	evolves	continuously	according	to	the	Schrödinger	equation,	but	during	a	
measurement,	the	wave	function	jumps	discontinuously	into	a	state	corresponding	to	a	determinate	
location,	with	probabilities	given	by	the	Born	rule.	The	latter	is	the	collapse	postulate.	
Applied	to	a	particle	in	the	state	shown	in	figure	1(c),	the	collapse	postulate	says	that	if	the	
position	of	the	particle	is	measured,	there	is	a	50%	chance	that	it	will	collapse	to	the	state	shown	in	
figure	1(a),	and	a	50%	chance	that	it	will	collapse	to	the	state	shown	in	figure	1(b).	Hence	even	
though	the	pre-measurement	state	is	not	one	in	which	the	particle	is	in	region	A,	and	not	one	in	
which	it	is	in	region	B,	the	collapse	postulate	together	with	the	post-collapse	state	can	explain	our	
measurement	results,	as	well	as	the	sense	in	which	these	results	reveal	the	actual	(post-
measurement)	location	of	the	particle.	
	 As	it	stands,	though,	the	collapse	postulate	is	untenable.	The	continuous,	linear	Schrödinger	
evolution	and	the	discontinuous,	non-linear	collapse	process	are	incompatible:	neither	can	be	
reduced	to	the	other.	So	to	be	consistent,	quantum	mechanics	must	postulate	a	sharp	division	
between	those	physical	processes	that	count	as	measurement	processes	and	those	that	do	not.	This	
seems	like	a	tall	order.	What’s	more,	since	measuring	devices	are	constructed	out	of	particles	that	
are	not	themselves	being	measured,	the	measuring	device	should	operate	according	to	the	
continuous	Schrödinger	evolution,	and	hence	cannot	instantiate	the	discontinuous	collapse	process.	
This	is	the	much-discussed	measurement	problem.	
	 It	is	worth	noting,	though,	that	the	problem	lies	not	with	collapse	per	se,	but	with	tying	the	
collapse	process	to	measurement.	If	a	collapse	process	could	be	described	that	yields	the	same	
Figure	1:	Three	quantum	states	
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outcome	without	the	appeal	to	measurement,	it	would	not	be	subject	to	the	same	critique.	This	is	
the	approach	to	the	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	pursued	by	dynamical	collapse	theories.	
	
2.	Dynamical	theories	of	collapse	
	
	The	basic	approach	was	first	described	by	Pearle	(1976):	instead	of	one	dynamical	law	describing	
measurements	and	another	applying	between	measurements,	a	single	dynamical	law	applies	at	all	
times,	deviating	just	slightly	from	the	Schrödinger	equation.	The	first	fully-developed	theory	along	
these	lines	was	proposed	by	Ghirardi,	Rimini	and	Weber	(1986),	and	has	become	known	as	the	GRW	
theory.	
	 According	to	the	GRW	theory,	the	wave	function	for	a	single	particle	obeys	a	dynamical	law	
that	mostly	coincides	with	the	Schrödinger	equation,	except	that	there	is	a	small	chance	per	unit	
time	that	the	wave	function	undergoes	a	spontaneous	collapse	process	(or	hit)	in	which	it	becomes	
highly	localized	around	a	point.	More	precisely,	a	hit	multiplies	the	wave	function	by	a	narrow	three-
dimensional	Gaussian	(bell	curve)	in	the	coordinates	of	the	particle	concerned,	where	the	width	of	
the	Gaussian	is	10–5cm.	
	 The	collapse	process	is	indeterministic	in	two	senses.	First,	whether	a	given	particle	
undergoes	a	collapse	is	a	random	matter:	there	is	a	chance	of	10–16	that	any	given	particle	will	
undergo	a	collapse	in	any	given	second.	Second,	if	a	particle	undergoes	a	collapse,	the	location	of	the	
hit	is	random,	with	probabilities	chosen	so	as	to	recover	the	Born	rule:	the	chance	that	the	Gaussian	
is	centred	in	a	particular	region	is	given	by	the	integral	over	that	region	of	the	pre-collapse	wave	
function	multiplied	by	the	Gaussian.	
	 For	a	single	particle	in	the	superposition	state	of	figure	1(c),	the	effect	of	a	hit	is	shown	
schematically	(in	one	dimension)	in	figure	2.	In	this	state,	there	is	a	50%	chance	of	the	hit	being	
centred	in	region	A,	and	a	50%	chance	of	it	being	centred	in	region	B.	If	it	is	centred	in	region	A,	then	
the	effect	is	as	shown:	almost	all	the	wave	amplitude	is	now	in	region	A,	although	a	tiny	amount	(not	
shown	to	scale!)	remains	in	region	B,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	“tails”	of	the	Gaussian	extend	to	
infinity.	It	looks	like	this	ought	to	be	close	enough	for	the	particle	to	count	as	being	in	region	A	after	
the	hit	(although	this	question	is	addressed	further	in	section	5).	
	 For	a	single	particle,	a	collapse	is	extremely	rare—about	one	every	100	million	years.	This	is	
just	as	well,	because	experimental	physics	shows	that	individual	particles	(and	small	collections	of	
them)	always	obey	the	Schrödinger	equation	very	closely.	But	for	a	macroscopic	object,	the	collapse	
rate	can	be	appreciable:	for	an	object	containing	of	the	order	of	1023	particles,	there	will	be	around	
10	million	collapse	events	per	second.	And	if	the	positions	of	the	particles	are	strongly	correlated	
with	each	other,	as	is	the	case	for	a	solid	object,	the	collapse	of	a	single	particle	is	sufficient	to	
localize	all	the	particles.	
	 This	is	shown	schematically	for	two	particles	in	figure	3.	The	wave	function	for	N	particles	is	
defined	over	a	configuration	space—a	3N-dimensional	space	of	configurations	of	particles.	For	two	
particles,	then,	the	wave	function	is	a	function	of	six	spatial	coordinates,	three	for	each	particle,	plus	
time:	𝜓(𝑥), 𝑦), 𝑧), 𝑥*, 𝑦*, 𝑧*, 𝑡).	Figure	3	represents	two	of	those	dimensions:	the	horizontal	axis	
Figure	2:	Collapse	for	a	single	particle	
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represents	one	of	the	spatial	dimensions	of	particle	1,	and	the	vertical	axis	represents	one	of	the	
spatial	dimensions	of	particle	2.	The	shaded	areas	represent	regions	where	the	wave	function	
amplitude	is	high.	
	 For	two	particles	whose	positions	are	strongly	correlated,	a	typical	superposition	state	is	as	
shown	in	figure	3(a):	all	the	wave	amplitude	is	concentrated	in	areas	representing	the	particles	as	
occupying	the	same	spatial	region.	If	particle	1	undergoes	a	hit,	the	wave	function	is	multiplied	by	a	
function	that	is	a	Gaussian	in	the	coordinates	of	particle	1	and	a	constant	in	the	coordinates	of	
particle	2,	so	it	is	large	only	in	the	“stripe”	shown	in	figure	3(b).	The	result	is	that	the	post-hit	wave	
function	is	large	only	in	region	A	for	both	particles.	The	same	goes	for	a	hit	on	particle	2.	That	is,	if	
either	particle	undergoes	a	collapse,	both	particles	acquire	locations.	
	 Of	course,	a	collapse	for	two	particles	is	still	exceedingly	rare.	But	for	a	macroscopic	solid	
object,	a	hit	on	one	of	the	particles	making	up	the	object	will	occur	on	average	every	tenth	of	a	
microsecond.	Furthermore,	because	of	the	forces	binding	the	particles	in	a	solid	object	together,	the	
wave	function	will	only	be	large	in	regions	of	configuration	space	in	which	the	particles	are	close	
together.	Due	to	these	strong	correlations	between	the	positions	of	the	particles	making	up	the	
object,	a	collapse	for	one	particle	is	sufficient	to	localize	the	whole	object.	
	 This	is	the	heart	of	the	dynamical	collapse	solution	to	the	measurement	problem.	Suppose	
we	start	with	a	single	particle	in	the	superposition	state	of	figure	1(c)	and	we	measure	its	position.	
Measuring	its	position	requires	us	to	correlate	its	position	with	something	we	can	see,	such	as	a	
pointer	on	a	dial.	But	in	doing	that,	we	create	a	macroscopic	object	in	a	superposition	of	two	distinct	
locations,	pointing	at	“A”	on	the	dial	and	pointing	at	“B”.	The	GRW	collapse	process	very	rapidly	
reduces	this	superposition	to	one	location	or	the	other,	and	since	the	particle	is	correlated	with	the	
pointer,	the	particle	too	acquires	a	determinate	location.	Hence	after	the	measurement,	the	particle	
is	either	in	region	A	or	in	region	B,	and	the	pointer	is	pointing	to	the	corresponding	measurement	
result.	
Note	that	there	is	no	essential	appeal	to	measurement	in	this	account.	When	we	correlate	a	
superposition	state	of	a	microscopic	system	with	the	position	of	a	macroscopic	solid	object,	the	GRW	
collapse	process	reduces	the	superposition	state	to	one	of	its	components,	and	it	does	so	according	
to	a	single,	precisely-specified	dynamical	law.	
To	accommodate	symmetrisation	requirements	for	identical	particles,	more	recent	
dynamical	collapse	theories	incorporate	the	collapse	process	as	a	non-linear	correction	to	the	
Schrödinger	equation,	rather	than	as	a	distinct	process,	producing	a	collapse	that	is	continuous	
rather	than	discrete	(Ghirardi,	Pearle	and	Rimini	1990).	Diosi	(1989)	and	Penrose	(1996)	further	
suggest	that	the	collapse	mechanism	may	be	connected	to	the	role	of	gravity.	Penrose	notes	that	the	
existence	of	a	macroscopic	object	in	a	superposition	of	two	distinct	locations	entails,	via	gravity,	a	
superposition	of	two	distinct	space-time	structures,	and	speculates	that	the	latter	superposition	may	
be	inherently	unstable.	At	present,	though,	gravitational	explanations	of	the	collapse	process	have	
no	empirical	support.	Indeed,	there	is	no	evidence	for	the	existence	of	a	collapse	process	at	all—
unless	one	takes	the	existence	of	definite	experimental	outcomes	as	evidence	for	collapse.	One	
Figure	3:	GRW	collapse	for	two	correlated	particles	
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might	take	the	lack	of	empirical	support	as	an	objection	to	the	entire	dynamical	collapse	project,	so	
let	us	briefly	consider	the	experimental	situation.	
	
3.	Tests	
	
Dynamical	collapse	theories	make	different	empirical	predictions	from	no-collapse	interpretations	of	
quantum	mechanics,	such	as	de	Broglie-Bohm	theory	(Tumulka,	this	volume)	and	Everettian	
quantum	mechanics	(Saunders,	this	volume).	So	can’t	we	just	perform	the	relevant	experiments	to	
see	which	is	right?	Unfortunately,	this	is	not	at	all	straightforward.	
	 There	is	no	problem	in	principle.	Dynamical	collapse	theories	predict	that	a	superposition	of	
distinct	locations	for	a	macroscopic	object	is	inherently	unstable,	and	will	rapidly	evolve	to	some	
determinate	location.	No-collapse	theories	predict	that	such	macroscopic	superpositions	are	stable.	
And	there	are	experiments	that	could	in	principle	distinguish	between	an	object	in	a	superposition	of	
locations	and	an	object	in	one	of	those	locations.	
	 But	in	practice,	these	experiments	are	impossible	to	perform.	Note	first	that	a	simple	
measurement	of	the	position	of	the	object	won’t	suffice	to	distinguish	the	superposition	from	the	
determinate	location.	That	is	because	both	collapse	and	no-collapse	interpretations	have	
mechanisms	to	ensure	that	a	measurement	on	a	superposition	state	yields	a	determinate	outcome,	
just	as	a	measurement	on	a	determinate	location	state	does.	
	 So	we	need	something	more	subtle.	What	is	required	is	an	interference	experiment,	in	which	
the	two	terms	in	the	superposition	are	made	to	interact	with	each	other,	indicating	that	they	are	
both	present.	Interference	experiments	are	very	sensitive	to	environmental	effects.	If	a	single	
outside	particle	becomes	correlated	with	one	term	in	the	superposition	but	not	the	other,	then	the	
interference	experiment	fails.	So	to	exhibit	interference	effects,	a	system	has	to	be	kept	completely	
isolated	from	the	environment.	This	is	possible	for	microscopic	systems,	but	is	practically	impossible	
for	macroscopic	systems.	
	 Nevertheless,	there	has	been	considerable	progress	in	demonstrating	interference	with	
larger	and	larger	systems.	Early	attempts	to	detect	quantum	collapse	centered	on	the	behavior	of	
superconducting	quantum	interference	devices	(SQUIDs).	Using	such	devices,	experimentalists	are	
able	to	create	and	detect	a	superposition	of	a	clockwise	and	a	counter-clockwise	electric	current	in	a	
ring	of	approximately	1cm	diameter.	Such	devices	do	not	reveal	any	collapse	effects.	However,	the	
superposition	in	a	SQUID,	though	macroscopic,	is	of	distinct	currents,	not	of	distinct	locations.	The	
wave	function	for	the	electrons	involved	is	distributed	over	the	whole	ring	whether	the	current	is	
clockwise	or	counter-clockwise.	So	a	GRW	collapse	to	a	precise	location	is	not	a	collapse	to	one	
current	over	the	other,	and	GRW	collapses	would	not	be	expected	to	have	a	measurable	effect	on	
the	current	(Rae	1990).	
	 Another	important	experimental	development	involves	demonstrating	interference	effects	
for	larger	and	larger	molecules.	Interference	can	now	be	demonstrated	for	relatively	large	organic	
molecules,	such	as	C48H26F24N8O8	(Juffmann	et	al.	2012).	This	shows	that	such	molecules	can	exist	in	
superpositions	of	distinct	location	states,	at	least	for	the	short	amount	of	time	it	takes	to	traverse	
the	apparatus.	But	even	such	a	large	molecule	involves	fewer	than	5000	fundamental	particles,	
inducing	a	GRW	collapse	rate	of	5000´10-16	per	second,	or	about	one	every	hundred	thousand	
years—still	far	too	rare	to	be	detectable.	
	 Further	methods	for	detecting	quantum	collapses	have	been	attempted	(Leggett	2002;	Bassi	
et	al.	2013).	So	far	we	have	no	empirical	evidence	to	suggest	that	quantum	collapses	occur,	but	
neither	are	the	particular	models	of	the	GRW	theory	and	its	continuous	variants	ruled	out.	So	
empirical	tests	are	inconclusive.	However,	there	is	an	indirect	empirical	argument	against	dynamical	
collapse	theories,	namely	that	they	conflict	with	another	well-confirmed	theory:	special	relativity.	
	 	
4.	Relativity	
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The	original	GRW	theory	conflicts	with	special	relativity	in	two	distinct	ways.	First,	when	a	particle	
undergoes	a	hit,	the	probability	distribution	for	the	centre	of	the	collapse	is	based	on	the	wave	
function	distribution	at	that	time.	But	according	to	special	relativity,	there	is	no	absolute	standard	of	
simultaneity,	so	the	state	of	a	spread-out	entity	at	a	time	is	ill-defined.	Second,	the	hit	
instantaneously	multiplies	the	wave	function	over	the	whole	of	space	by	a	Gaussian,	and	again	this	
process	is	ill-defined	according	to	special	relativity.	In	particular,	for	correlated	particles	a	hit	on	one	
particle	has	an	instantaneous	effect	on	the	state	of	another	particle,	no	matter	how	far	apart,	and	
instantaneous	action	at	a	distance	is	prima	facie	incompatible	with	special	relativity.	
	 However,	progress	has	been	made	in	constructing	a	dynamical	collapse	theory	that	is	
consistent	with	special	relativity	(see	Myrvold,	this	volume,	for	further	details).	Tumulka	(2006),	
following	some	remarks	by	Bell	(1987,	205),	suggests	that	the	ontology	of	GRW-type	theories	should	
be	understood	as	point-like:	the	spatio-temporal	point	at	the	centre	of	a	hit	event	is	a	“flash”	of	
reality,	and	the	spread-out	wave	function	can	be	interpreted	instrumentally	as	governing	the	
probability	distribution	for	these	flashes.	So	for	a	single	particle	system,	what	exists	is	a	set	of	point-
like	events,	about	one	per	hundred	million	years.	Since	the	wave	function	is	treated	instrumentally,	
there	is	no	real	collapse	of	the	wave	function	that	could	conflict	with	relativity.	Furthermore,	given	a	
flash	event	at	a	particular	space-time	point,	the	probability	distribution	for	the	location	of	the	next	
flash	event	is	defined	over	surfaces	that	are	relativistically	invariant—that	is,	over	surfaces	such	that	𝑥* + 𝑦* + 𝑧* − 𝑐*𝑡*	is	a	constant,	rather	than	simultaneity	surfaces	for	which	𝑡	is	a	constant.	
Alternatively,	Ghirardi,	Grassi,	and	Benatti	(1995)	suggest	that	the	appropriate	ontology	for	
GRW-type	theories	is	a	mass	density	distribution	defined	over	three-dimensional	space.	In	relativistic	
versions,	the	mass	density	in	a	small	region	of	space	is	determined	by	the	state	in	the	past	light	cone	
of	that	region	(Bedingham	et	al.	2014).	Hence	a	hit	centred	on	a	space-time	point	produces	high	
mass	density	at	that	point,	and	a	surrounding	region	of	near-zero	mass	density	that	spreads	
outwards	at	the	speed	of	light	as	the	collapse	event	enters	the	past	light	cone	of	surrounding	points	
(Myrvold	2016).	
	 Hence	for	a	single	particle,	versions	of	the	GRW	theory	can	be	made	consistent	with	special	
relativity.	But	for	two	or	more	particles,	there	is	still	the	worry	that	for	correlated	particles,	a	hit	on	
one	particle	can	instantly	affect	the	other,	no	matter	how	distant.	Tumulka	(2006,	350)	suggests	that	
this	can	be	accommodated	within	special	relativity	by	allowing	that	the	direction	of	the	influence	is	
indeterminate.	Consider	two	particles	whose	perfectly-correlated	z-coordinates	are	measured	at	
space-like	separated	x-coordinates.	In	some	frames	of	reference,	the	measurement	of	particle	1	
occurs	first,	and	causes	particle	2	to	acquire	a	determinate	z-coordinate;	in	other	frames	of	
reference,	the	measurement	of	particle	2	occurs	first,	and	causes	particle	1	to	acquire	a	determinate	
z-coordinate.	Neither	causal	story	is	to	be	preferred,	so	no	absolute	standard	of	simultaneity	is	
required.	
Even	so,	both	causal	stories	require	faster-than-light	causation.	However,	this	is	not	in	direct	
conflict	with	special	relativity;	rather,	it	just	requires	that	the	probabilities	ascribed	to	the	
measurement	outcomes	depend	on	the	frame	of	reference.	In	the	frame	in	which	particle	1	is	
measured	first,	one	particular	measurement	outcome	for	particle	2	has	probability	1	prior	to	
measurement,	whereas	in	the	frame	in	which	particle	2	is	measured	first,	no	measurement	outcome	
for	particle	2	has	probability	1	prior	to	measurement	(Myrvold	2002,	461).		Indeed,	Myrvold	(2016)	
prefers	to	say	that	there	are	non-local	probabilistic	correlations	here,	but	no	superluminal	causation,	
on	the	grounds	that	the	direction	of	causal	relations	cannot	be	indeterminate.	
	
5.	Tails	
	
So	consistency	with	special	relativity	is	a	problem	for	dynamical	collapse	theories,	but	perhaps	not	
an	insuperable	one.	However,	solving	this	problem	is	moot	if,	as	some	have	claimed,	the	dynamical	
collapse	approach	does	not	even	minimally	solve	the	measurement	problem.	
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	 The	source	of	this	concern	is	that,	as	mentioned	above,	for	a	particle	in	the	superposition	
state	2(a),	a	collapse	does	not	ensure	that	all	the	post-collapse	wave	function	amplitude	is	in	region	
A	(or	in	region	B),	just	that	most	of	it	is.	The	same	goes	for	a	macroscopic	object.	If	a	human	being,	
ends	up	in	a	superposition	of	occupying	two	distinct	regions,	for	example	as	a	result	of	correlating	
her	location	with	the	position	of	a	particle	in	a	superposition	state,	then	collapses	will	very	rapidly	
put	her	state	close	to	one	in	which	all	her	wave	function	amplitude	is	located	in	one	of	those	regions.	
However,	there	remains	a	small	but	non-zero	amplitude	in	the	other	location.	
	 	One	form	of	the	concern	goes	as	follows.	In	the	example	above,	the	small	term	in	the	post-
collapse	state	has	exactly	the	same	internal	structure	as	the	big	term:	it	is	the	structure	of	a	human	
being.	Granted	a	rather	plausible	functionalism,	it	is	the	structure	of	a	term,	not	its	amplitude,	
determines	what	it	represents	(Wallace	2003).	But	then	there	is	a	human	being	in	both	locations,	
and	dynamical	collapse	theories	are	ineffective	at	bringing	about	determinate	measurement	
outcomes	(Cordero	1999).	
	 Since	the	source	of	this	problem	is	the	non-zero	“tails”	of	the	Gaussian	collapse	function	
stretching	to	infinity	in	every	direction,	the	most	obvious	solution	is	to	eliminate	the	tails	(Wallace	
2014).	That	is,	is	the	collapse	function	were	strictly	zero	at	distances	greater	than	10-5cm	from	the	
collapse	centre,	then	after	a	collapse	there	would	be	a	wave	term	with	the	structure	of	a	human	
being	at	only	one	location.	
	 But	there	is	another	form	of	the	concern	about	tails	that	is	resistant	to	this	solution.	
Between	collapses,	the	state	of	a	particle	evolves	according	to	the	Schrödinger	equation,	and	this	
means	that	even	if	collapse	makes	the	wave	function	strictly	zero	outside	a	given	region	at	a	time,	it	
has	tails	extending	to	infinity	an	instant	later.	So	if	what	it	is	for	a	particle	to	be	located	in	a	region	is	
that	all	its	wave	amplitude	is	located	in	that	region	(as	we	assumed	earlier),	then	after	a	collapse	the	
particle	is	still	not	located	in	any	finite	region	of	space,	and	dynamical	collapse	theories	do	not	solve	
the	measurement	problem	after	all	(Albert	and	Loewer	1990).	
	 One	might	take	this	as	an	additional	motivation	to	adopt	a	“flashy”	version	of	GRW,	so	that	
the	ontology	resides	only	at	the	precise	instants	of	collapse.	Albert	and	Loewer	(1996)	instead	
suggest	solving	this	problem	by	relaxing	the	link	between	wave	function	amplitude	and	particle	
location:	instead	of	demanding	that	all	the	wave	amplitude	be	contained	in	a	region	for	the	particle	
to	count	as	being	located	there,	we	only	require	that	almost	all	of	it	is	so	located.	This	works,	but	at	
the	cost	of	introducing	a	new	kind	of	vagueness:	there	is	presumably	no	fact	of	the	matter	about	
precisely	how	much	of	the	amplitude	needs	to	be	in	the	region	for	the	particle	to	count	as	located	
there.	Whether	this	vagueness	is	problematic	is	considered	in	section	7.	
	
6.	Chance	
	
Quantum	mechanics	is	often	taken	to	be	an	indeterministic	theory.	But	this	is	not	a	straightforward	
consequence	of	the	theory:	the	de	Broglie-Bohm	and	Everettian	versions	are	deterministic	at	the	
fundamental	level.	Nevertheless,	dynamical	collapse	theories	really	are	irreducibly	indeterministic:	
they	incorporate	objective	chances	into	fundamental	physical	law	(see	Emery,	this	volume,	and	
Suarez,	this	volume,	for	more	on	chance	and	determinism).	
	 What	consequences	does	this	have?	Albert	(2000)	suggests	that	the	role	of	chance	in	
dynamical	collapse	theories	can	solve	a	problem	in	the	foundations	of	statistical	mechanics.	It	is	well	
known	that	for	a	given	macrostate,	the	microstates	exhibiting	normal	thermodynamic	behaviour	
vastly	outnumber	those	exhibiting	abnormal	behaviour,	but	it	is	far	from	clear	how	this	asymmetry	
can	be	used	to	explain	thermodynamic	behaviour	(see	Shahvisi,	this	volume,	for	further	discussion).	
Albert	notes	that	if	there	were	some	mechanism	by	which	the	states	of	systems	were	randomly	and	
asymmetrically	perturbed	at	the	microscopic	level,	then	normal	thermodynamic	behaviour	would	be	
straightforwardly	explicable	via	this	asymmetry.	Dynamical	collapse	theories	entail	this	random,	
asymmetric	perturbation,	but	other	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics,	notably	de	Broglie-Bohm	
and	Everett,	do	not.	Hence	dynamical	collapse	theories	might	gain	indirect	support	from	the	
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foundations	of	statistical	mechanics	(Shenker,	this	volume,	discusses	some	further	ways	in	which	
quantum	mechanics	may	bear	on	the	foundations	of	statistical	mechanics).	
	 More	controversially,	some	see	the	indeterminism	of	dynamical	collapse	theories	as	opening	
the	door	for	a	reconciliation	of	free	will	with	physics.	The	trouble	with	such	suggestions	is	that	the	
collapse	process	is	random,	and	randomness	looks	no	more	hospitable	to	free	will	than	determinism.	
Still,	Kane	(1996)	suggests	that	genuine	indeterminacy,	even	if	it	is	random,	is	essential	to	free	will.	
The	idea	is	that	an	agent	must	be	ultimately	responsible	for	their	character	if	they	are	to	be	truly	
free,	and	a	collapse	in	the	brain	at	a	suitable	juncture,	even	if	it	is	random,	might	be	enough	to	
secure	ultimate	responsibility.	
Along	similar	lines,	some	have	seen	a	connection	between	collapse	and	consciousness.	Prior	
to	the	advent	of	dynamical	collapse	theories,	Wigner	(1961)	famously	speculated	that	consciousness	
might	be	required	to	explain	the	collapse	postulate.	More	recently,	Hameroff	and	Penrose	(1996)	
suggest	that	dynamical	collapses	in	the	brain	might	explain	consciousness,	insofar	as	consciousness	
requires	non-computability,	and	quantum	collapse	can	introduce	non-computability.	It	is	worth	
noting,	though,	that	these	proposals	concerning	free	will	and	consciousness	add	various	highly	
contested	philosophical	claims	to	the	already	controversial	status	of	collapse	theories.	
	
7.	Ontology	
	
If	a	dynamical	collapse	theory	is	true,	what	does	this	tell	us	about	the	furniture	of	the	world?	The	
clearest	consequence	is	that	particles	are	not	fundamental.	The	fundamental	law	of	a	dynamical	
collapse	theory	governs	the	evolution	of	a	wave	function,	and	the	wave	function	alone	underlies	all	
our	empirical	observations.	After	a	collapse,	the	wave	function	becomes	highly	localized	in	three	of	
its	dimensions,	and	while	that	localization	persists	we	can	speak	of	a	particle	occupying	a	
determinate	position	in	three-dimensional	space.	But	this	“particle”	is	just	a	manner	of	speaking	
about	the	wave	function.	
	 However,	there	are	several	reasons	to	doubt	that	the	ontology	of	dynamical	collapse	
theories	consists	of	the	wave	function	and	nothing	but	the	wave	function.	First,	as	noted	in	section	
4,	some	attempts	to	reconcile	dynamical	collapse	theories	with	special	relativity	replace	the	wave	
function	with	discrete,	point-like	events	or	with	a	mass	density	distribution	over	three-dimensional	
space.	However,	special	relativity	arguably	does	not	rule	out	the	view	that	the	wave	function	is	
fundamental,	provided	one	is	willing	to	ascribe	a	distinct	wave	function	to	every	spacelike	
hypersurface	(Myrvold	2002).	
	 Second,	the	wave	function	for	a	system	of	N	particles	is	defined	over	a	3N-dimensional	
configuration	space.	Hence	it	seems	that	if	the	wave	function	is	fundamental,	then	the	appearance	
of	the	world	as	three-dimensional	is	somehow	illusory	(Albert	1996).	To	avoid	this	conclusion,	
several	commentators	have	again	postulated	that	the	fundamental	ontology	of	dynamical	collapse	
theories	includes	a	mass	density	distribution	over	three-dimensional	space	whose	value	in	a	region	
can	be	derived	from	the	wave	function	(Allori	2013).	The	issue	of	dimensionality	can	also	be	used	to	
motivate	a	flash	ontology,	since	flashes	are	defined	at	points	of	three-dimensional	space.	However,	
it	is	also	possible	to	argue	that	the	wave	function	indirectly	describes	objects	in	three-dimensional	
space,	bypassing	these	concerns	(Lewis	2013).	
	 Third,	some	have	argued	that	the	wave	function	needs	to	be	supplemented	to	counteract	
the	effects	of	the	novel	quantum	vagueness	introduced	by	dynamical	collapse	theories	(section	5).	
This	vagueness	allows	a	particle	to	count	as	occupying	a	region	when	almost	all	its	wave	amplitude	is	
in	that	region.	It	follows	from	this	and	the	high-dimensional	nature	of	the	wave	function	that	for	a	
set	of	particles,	each	can	individually	count	as	occupying	a	given	region,	even	though	the	set	taken	as	
a	whole	does	not	count	as	occupying	the	region.	The	same	goes	for	macroscopic	objects	(Lewis	
1997).	If	objects	are	constituted	by	a	mass	density	distribution	rather	than	by	a	wave	amplitude	
distribution,	then	this	problem	does	not	arise	(Bassi	and	Ghirardi	1999).	However,	it	is	not	clear	that	
there	is	really	a	problem	here	that	needs	solution:	the	strange	properties	of	compound	objects	can	
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be	regarded	as	an	inevitable	consequence	of	the	mismatch	between	our	classical	concepts	and	the	
quantum	world	(Lewis	2003).	
The	ontological	consequences	of	dynamical	collapse	theories	remain	an	area	of	active	
debate.1	
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